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The accounting scandals and the demise of Andersen have increased auditors' ex ante business 
risk.  As a  result, stock markets revised downward the value of the audit firms  (Asthana et 
al.  2003;  Chaney and Philipich 2002;  Krishnamurthy et al.  2002;  Callen and Morel 2002). 
One commonsensical reaction on behalf of auditors should have been to apply the existing 
rules more carefully and, thus, issue more non-clean audit opinions.  This is exactly what we 
see.  Closer scrutiny reveals that the higher incidence of non-clean audit opinions is not due to 
the (substantial) changes in the audit client list or their balance sheets.  Instead, shifts in the 
client characteristics seem to have masked the Enron effect, and especially so in the non-Big5 
sample.  This study mirrors earlier results where auditors relaxed their standards following a 
drop in business risk (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2001, 2002; Francis and Krishnan, 2002). 
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Introduction 
When, after Enron's collapse (October-December 2001),  the less than glamorous role played 
by Arthur Andersen gradually became evident,  analysts and the press suddenly eyed audit 
reports much more critically.  This meant a higher probability that audit failures, if any, might 
be detected. And when, a few months later, the unthinkable happened and a Big5 auditor sank 
in a matter of months, in the minds of the profession the expected damage to the auditor if 
and when a failure is discovered was revised upwards by several notches.  Some response to the 
resulting increase in auditors' business risk was natural, under the circumstances.  Sarbanes-
Oxley raised the explicit audit standards,  by imposing new rules.  We  argue that auditors 
simultaneously raised their implicit audit standards-that is, they increased compliance with 
the existing explicit audit reporting standards,  or lowered  the materiality threshold.l  The 
tell-tale sign of a  rise of the implicit standards, everything else being the same, would be a 
higher incidence of non-clean audit opinions; and such a higher incidence is exactly what we 
observe, even after sifting out effects from increased risk and changing clienteles in the sample. 
In fact, the sifted evidence is in many ways stronger than the prima facie  one. 
In the remainder of this paper we first discuss the auditor's alternatives and the practical 
difficulties  we  face  when measuring their response.  We next describe the sample in greater 
detail, we estimate to what extent shifts in company risks have affected auditor behavior, and 
test whether there remains a  residual schift that may be attributable to an Enron-Andersen 
effect. 
IThis refers to the level of deviation between accounting numbers and standards that is  acceptable to an 
auditor. For unacceptable deviations, the auditor demands an adjustment, and writes a non-clean audit opinion 
if the client firms does not make the adjustment.  Consistent with prior audit reporting studies, the term non-
clean audit opinion comprises all types of audit opinions other than unqualified opinions (or clean opinions); 
thus, it comprises modified opinions, qualified opinions, adverse opinions and disclaimers of opinion, as well as 
going-concern opinions. Post-Enron auditing standards  2 
Table 1:  The incidence of non-dean opinions among Big5 and non-Big5 auditors, 
1999-2002 
non-clean opinions in sample, %  # of audit clients in sample 
Year  all auditors  Big Five  other  all auditors  Big Five  other 
1999  5.26%  4.12%  19.9%  3,327  3,085  242 
2000  5.41%  4.16%  21.5%  3,367  3,125  242 
2001  6.84%  6.01%  20.5%  3,087  2,911  176 
2002  6.85%  6.09%  19.9%  2,905  2,744  161 
total  6.05%  5.05%  20.5%  12,686  11,865  821 
change  +1.59%  +1.97%  +0.01%  -12.7%  -11.0%  -33.5% 
non-clean Table 1.  The sample consists of all non-financials covered by  Worldscope  for  which all required 
data were available.  "Non-clean opinion" covers qualified and modified opinions. 
The prima facie evidence 
Toughening the implicit standards would surely have been a sensible response to the auditor's 
increased business  risk.  First,  a  prior  non-clean opinion does  reduce the chance that the 
auditor gets sued if  the auditee keels over (Carcello and Palmrose, 1994).  Second, the auditors' 
alternative ways to handle the increased business risk must have looked far less appealing. For 
instance, they could have bought outside insurance, or increased fees  so as to auto-insure, or 
stepped up the auditing effort itself.  But each of these would have meant higher fees;2  and 
getting more money would have been a  hard sell in the critical climate of the time.  Next to 
increasing the standards, the auditors might also have weeded out the riskier audit clients,3 
but we do not explicitly study that possible reaction. 
In short, raising implicit auditing reporting standards should have made sense.  And sure 
enough, among the Worlds cope-covered non-financials in our sample, the number of non-clean 
opinions rose from  5.3  percent in 1999 to 6.9  percent in 2002,  the first  unambiguously post-
Enron/  Andersen year4  (Table 1).  Upon closer inspection of the figures,  however, the story no 
longer appears as cut and dry, and the main task we set ourself in this paper is to show that 
2Prior audit-fee studies indeed suggest that fees do reflect variations in client-specific litigation risk factors 
(see for example Simunic 1980; Palmrose 1986; Francis and Simon 1987; Simunic and Stein 1996). 
3Krishnan and Krishnan (1997),  Johnstone (2000)  and Francis and Krishnan (2002)  report some evidence 
consistent with auditors screening out high-risk clients. 
4 A year refers to the customer's reporting period. The auditor's report is usually released in the subsequent 
calendar year.  Andersen was barred from auditing SEC-registered companies in June 2002,  but by that time 
most of the "2001"  audit reports had been written. Post-Enron auditing standards  3 
the simple univariate analysis, above, does get us the right picture. 
Tougher standards or tougher circumstances? 
Table 1 shows that, first,  the higher incidence of non-clean opinions seems to be confined to 
big-5 auditees.  Among the  Worlds  cope-covered non-financials with full  data and a  non-Big5 
auditor, the relative number of non-clean opinions did not change all that much over the 1999-
2002 period, while for  Big5 auditees the number rose by 2 percent (i.e.  from 4.1  percent to 
6.1  percent).  Did the smaller players not feel  any pressure?  One could indeed argue that the 
amount of reputational capital at risk for a Big5 firm was higher (DeAngelo, 1981), but that's 
a far cry from saying that smaller firms stood nothing to lose at all.  Or were the smaller ones 
already so perfectionist-"we try harder"?-that no extra action was called for?  Adherents of 
this view might point out the four times higher incidence of non-clean opinions;5  but critics 
would reply that the non-Big5 clientele may be different, too. 
The Big5/non-Big5 divide is  not the only puzzling figure in Table 1.  Equally mystifying, 
from the Enron/  Andersen perspective, for non-Big5 firms the peak year within the 1999-2002 
window actually is  2000,  which is  unambiguously prior to Enron.  So there must have been 
other factors at work.  A change in economic circumstances may have mattered, for one.  2000 
was the year the leT bubble burst, and one would expect relatively more of these companies 
to have a  non-Big5  auditor.  But the economic context could also have been responsible for 
part of the 2001  rise in Big5 qualifications and modifications:  notorious events in 2001  beside 
Enron include the widening of the stock-market slump, IX-H, and a drastic slowdown in general 
economic activity. In short, the deterioration of many auditees' financial situations should have 
made the auditors more careful even without the Enron-Andersen event.  Another interfering 
factor might have been shifts in the sample, generating noise and, possibly, bias.  From Table 1 
we indeed note that between 1999 and 2002 the number of non-Big5 audit clients in the sample 
dropped by over one third. True, most of the deleted firms dropped from the sample because of 
an incomplete Worlds cope record, not because of a take-over or bankruptcy. Still, such a drastic 
shift in the composition of the sample may have masked a possible toughening of non-Big5 audit 
reporting standards, especially if incomplete data records would go  together with generally 
more shoddy reporting practices and,  therefore,  more objections from  the auditor.  Such a 
5In line with this, some prior studies find that the materiality thresholds of non-Big6 auditors are much lower 
than those of Big6 auditors (Messier 1983), and that non-Big6 auditors are more likely to issue a  consistency 
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correlation between data incompleteness and poor reporting practices is not inconceivable:  in 
our Big5-customer sample, which supposedly tends to contain the safer and more careful firms, 
the shrinkage because of missing data is just 11  percent. 
In short, there may be more going on behind the numbers than meets the eye.  Given the 
significant  change in the lists of audit client firms  and the adverse change in the economic 
environment for  many audit clients, one should figure  out to what extent the occurrence of 
non-clean opinions is due to changes in audit clients' risk profiles rather than a reaction to En-
ron/  Andersen. In fact, we do find that the Big5's increased use of modified/  qualified opinions is 
hardly affected by changes of audit client characteristics, while after filtering out client-quality 
effects also the non-Big5 auditors appear to have become markedly more critical, not less. 
Our study is,  to the best of our knowledge, the only one thus far  studying the auditors' 
reaction to Enron/  Andersen, but several other articles indirectly support our logic.  Studies of 
the reaction of the stock market (Asthana et al.  2003;  Chaney and Philipich 2002;  Krishna-
murthy et al.  2002;  Callen and Morel 2002) show that stock prices of clients of both Andersen 
and other Big5/4 auditors dropped significantly, especially after the release of negative infor-
mation concerning the role of Andersen in the Enron case.  This clearly suggests that auditor 
brand names and reputations were severely damaged and that serious doubt existed concern-
ing audit quality and, consequently, the credibility of audited financial statements.  There are 
also studies showing auditors' reaction to a  relaxation of business risk rather than a  rise  in 
it.  Notably, Geiger and Raghunandan (2001,  2002)  and Francis and Krishnan (2002)  report 
that auditors became less  likely to issue a  going-concern modified opinion after the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,  which reduced the likelihood of litigation against 
auditors.  Our prima facie findings-a rise of implicit audit standards following an increase in 
risk-is consistent with this literature. 
The sample and the variables 
Our sample includes all U.S.  listed firms for  which data are available on  Worldscope  for  the 
fiscal years 1999,  2001,  2002 or 2002.  This provides about 30,000 records.  As  in prior audit 
reporting research  (Reynolds and Francis,  2001;  DeFond, Raghunandan and Subramanyam, 
2002)  we  exclude financial  institutions,  i.e.  5,000  records  relating to SIC codes 6000-6999, 
because the measures of financial  distress that will  be used in our empirical model are not 
applicable to the financial sector.  We also exclude observations with missing values  (about 
12,500 records).  This process results in a sample of 12686 firm-years relating to 3367 different Post-Enron auditing standards  5 
Table 2:  Exits and (re)entries, final sample, 1999-2002 
year 
1999-2000  2000-2001  2001-2002 
Number of exits  73  336  332 
Number of (re)entries  113  56  150 
Net change  40  -280  -182 
Key to Table 2.  The sample consists of all non-financials covered by Worldscope for which all required data 
were available.  "Non-clean opinion"  covers modified, qualified and adverse opinions. 
companies. 
The impact of missing variables on the sample is substantial, reducing the number of usable 
observations to about one half of the original.  This means that the year-to-year changes in the 
sample, noted in Table 1, stem not just from exits (because of delistings or missing date), but 
the net result of (re)entries and exits.  Table 2 shows the migrations by direction.  Of the 3367 
firms in the 2000 sample, for instance, 10.8 percent are no longer present in the 2001  sample, 
while 1.2 percent of the 2001 records were not in the 2000 sample. We therefore need to verify 
to what extent these large shifts in the sample composition contributed to the changes in the 
frequency of modified non-clean opinions. 
Our measure of implicit auditor reporting standards is the number of non-clean opinions. 
Note that we could have made separate studies per type of non-clean opinion.  However, there 
is little a priori reason why some types of statements would be immune to the change in the 
auditing climate.  There also is a statistical argument:  fragmenting the event into sub-events, 
one gets smaller probabilities of occurrence and, therefore, less power. 
Our prime task is to filter out, from the incidences of non-clean opinions, those that can be 
ascribed to year-by-year shifts in audit related risks.  These risks can be divided in three major 
types:  task-specific, client-specific and auditor-specific.  To that end, we let the probability of 
non-clean opinion vary,  logit-style,  in light of risk variables that are standard in prior audit 
reporting studies. The first two control variables are task-specific and include the proportions of 
inventory and receivables to total assets (AR/TA and Inven/TA, respectively), two accounting 
items that are typically more prone to errors and irregularities (Dopuch et al.  1987, Bell and 
Tabor 1991), and that typically are positively correlated to the incidence of a non-clean audit 
opinion.  The next three audit-risk regressors are client specific.  PBankr is  a  proxy for  the 
probability of bankruptcy, computed using Zmijewski's (1984)  model.  Higher values indicate 
a larger probability of bankruptcy and a  larger likelihood that auditors will issue a non-clean Post-Enron auditing standards  6 
opinion for  going concern or other reasons (Francis and Krishnan 2002;  DeFond et al.  2002). 
The next measure of financial distress we  include is  lloss'  an indicator taking a  unit value 
if current-year earnings are negative and zero  otherwise  (Francis and Krishnan 1999).  Our 
third client-related variable is client size,  measured as In( TA),  the natural logarithm of total 
assets.  As  an audit-risk proxy,  this one is  ambiguous.  On the one hand, larger firms  tend 
to have more complex structures, which increases the chance that something gets overlooked, 
while also the potential damage from any audit failure increases in client size.  On the other 
hand, auditors may also be more confident that large clients may survive financial difficulties, 
because they are often better diversified, or have greater negotiating power with creditors and 
more resources (Reynolds and Francis 2001, 392). It has to be noted, however, that there may 
also be a link from customer size to audit behavior that has nothing to do with audit risk:  a 
larger client brings in bigger audit fees,  which could lead to less conservative reporting.  Our 
last variable related to audit risk is auditor specific:  an indicator I Big' which is set equal to 
unity if the company's auditor is  a Big-5 or Big-4 auditor, and zero otherwise.  Large auditors 
have more reputational capital to lose if something goes wrong;  but they may also attract a 
more blue-chip, lower-risk clientele.  Previous research shows that auditor reporting behavior 
is  linked to auditor size  (Mutchler et al.  1997), with Big-5  auditors issuing more non-clean 
opinions, ceteris paribus. 
The main test variable is the post-Enron indicator, I Enr. There is some a priori ambiguity 
whether the full  reaction to Enron/  Andersen should already be expected in the audits of the 
2001  statements.  To steer clear of that, we treat 1999-2000 as pre-Enron (that is,  lEnT =  0), 
skip 2001  in the tests, and treat 2002 as the post-Enron sample (IEnT  =  1).  In light of the 
evidence from Table 1, we let the intercept and the coefficient for I Enr differ across the Big5 
and non-Big5 samples. This approach assumes that the coefficients for the control variables are 
the same for the two sets of auditors. We test this assumption by running separate regressions 
for the Big5 and non-Big5 observations, respectively.  Thus, the basic logit models are 
Part pooled:  Logit (IMod) 
Big5:  Logit (IMod) 
Non-Big5:  Logit (IMod) 
where rx 
[000 + f30l Enrl(l - l big ) + [001  + f31l EnrJIbig + rx (0.1) 
001 + f31l Enr + r X  (0.2) 
000 + f30l Enr + r X  (0.3) 
AR  lnven 
'"Y. PBankr + 5In(TA) + ( TA + rJ  TA  (0.4) Post-Enron auditing standards  7 
Table 3:  Logit analysis of non-clean opinions among Big5 and non-Big5 auditors, 
1999-2002 
predicted  pooled  Big Five  non Big5 
sign  N =9599  N =  8954  N =  645 
Main test variables 
pre-EA non-Big5 constant  ~0.9803  ~1.3463 
(0.0052)  (0.1014) 
EA effect, non-Big5  +  0.2338  0.2112 
(0.3990)  (0.4442) 
pre-EA Big5 constant  ~  1.5840  ~1.5579 
(0.0002)  (0.0001) 
EA effect, Big5  +  0.4291  0.4337 
(0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Control variables 
AR/TA  +  ~0.2476  ~0.0596  ~0.3227 
(0.1218)  (0.8666)  (0.3466) 
fnven/TA  +  0.4406  0.4645  ~0.0207 
(0.1648)  (0.1915)  (0.9783) 
PBankr  +  1.8566  1.8349  2.0187 
( <0.0001)  «0.0001)  «0.0001) 
floss  +  1.7454  1.8021  1.4445 
( <0.0001)  «0.0001)  (0.0002) 
In(TA)  ?  ~0.2655  ~0.2747  ~0.1938 
( <0.0001)  «0.0001)  (0.0064) 
Model Chi-square (df)  1187.6 (8)  818.0 (6)  193.2  (6) 
( <0.0001)  «0.0001)  «0.0001) 
Pseudo R-square  27.96%  23.96%  29.55% 
Correctly classified (%)  86.3  84.7  85.8 
Key to Table 3. The sample consists of all non-financials covered by  Worlds cope  for  which all required data 
were available.  "Non-clean opinion" covers modified, qualified and adverse opinions.  The"  pooled"  regression 
has common coefficients for  the control variables, but separate constants and Enron-Andersen ("EA") effects 
for  the Big5 and non-Big5 observations.  The other regressions work with separate samples for  the Big5 and 
non-Big5 observations. Post-Enron auditing standards 
Table 4:  Probabilities of non-clean opinions, holding constant the sample 
year: 
fitted value given X2000 
uncorrected actual frequencies 
Big5 auditors 
2000  2002  change 
4.35%  6.10%  +1.75% 
4.16%  6.09%  +1.93% 
non-Big5 auditors 
2000  2002  change 
22.07%  24.57%  +2.50% 
21.50%  19.90%  -1.60% 
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Key to Table 4.  The sample consists of all non-financials covered by Worlds cope  for  which all required data 
were available.  "Non-clean opinion"  covers qualified and modified opinions.  The table uses  the analysis of 
Table 3 to show fitted probabilities for the 2000 sample, and, under the header "2002", the fitted value for the 
same sample but with the time post-Enron effect added. The latter numbers estimate the chances of non-clean 
opinions if there had been no change in the list of clients and in their balance sheets. 
Results and discussion 
The logit models agree with the univariate analysis discussed in the introduction:  there is  a 
clear Enron-Andersen effect  for  Big5 auditors, while for  the smaller auditing firms the effect 
is  statistically unclear.  The Big5  intercept is  convincingly different from  the non-Big5  one; 
that is,  the latter's higher use of non-clean opinions cannot be solely explained by the audit 
client  characteristics included in the regression.  All these findings  are quite robust,  as can 
be judged from  the following  checks  (full  results  are  available on request).  The Big5  rise 
remains significant  when we  exclude  Andersen clients,  or  when we  run the regressions  for 
each Big-5  auditor separately.  Following  many studies of going-concern  opinions,  we  also 
single out the financially distressed firms  (Mutchler, Hopwood and McKeown 1997; Reynolds 
and Francis 2001;  DeFond, Raghunandan and Subnlmanyam 2002)-firms that report either 
negative earnings or operating cash flows  during the current fiscal  year.  This sample, about 
one-fourth of the total,  has far  more non-clean opinions (12.45  percent),  but otherwise the 
results are qualitative similar to our main ones.  Lastly, when we take the post-EA year to be 
2001  rather than 2002,  or when we  include both as post-event data (each with its own time 
effect), the conclusions remain likewise unaffected. 
The statistical insignificance  of the post-Enron shift  for  non-Big5  firms  warrants some 
comments. This insignificance is the result of a largeish standard error (caused, in turn, by the 
smaller sample and more coming-and-goings in the audit client list), not of a small estimated 
effect.  In fact,  also the hypothesis that there is  no difference between the post-Enron shifts 
in non-Big5  and Big5  behavior is  statistically acceptable.  In unclear cases  like  this,  one's 
priors should playa major role,  and there are no good reasons why smaller auditors would 
not have  reacted at all.  Note that,  algebraically speaking,  the estimated effect  is  positive. Post-Enron auditing standards  9 
That is,  the impression of no effect  we  get  from  the univariate data in Table 1 appears to 
be caused by shifts in the sample; taking into account these aspects, one actually observes a 
rise in the incidence of non-clean opinions.  True, Table 3 gives the impression that the effect 
is  still smaller than for  Big5 firms,  but that is  an illusion too.  The coefficients in the table 
measure the sensitivity of the log odds ratio, which is non-linear (S-shaped) in the arguments. 
In fact,  in view of the higher probabilities, the typical non-Big5  auditee is  higher up the S-
curve,  where the sensitivities to the regressors  are higher  too.  To estimate the change in 
probabilities holding constant the sample, we compute the 2000 and 2001  fitted odds for each 
firm, freezing the sample composition and company characteristics at their 2000 level.  Table 
4  shows the resulting marginal probability.  For Big5  auditees,  the  ceteris-paribus  effect  is 
estimated at +1.75 percent,  quite close to the observed rise of 1.93  percent.  For  non-Big5 
auditees, however,  the diagnosis is that, holding constant the sample, we  would have seen a 
rise of 2.5 percent rather than a  drop by 1.6 percent.  Thus, the apparent lack of reaction on 
behalf of non-Big5 auditors seems to be because many of their clients in the sample became 
less risky.  This fits in with the fact that their peak year, 2000,  is the year of the bursting of 
the ICT bubble. 
We conclude with a brief discussion of the results for the control variables.  The financial 
distress variables  all  come  in with the expected sign,  and quite significantly so:  a  higher 
bankruptcy risk and a  negative profit or cash flow  have a  massive impact on the chances of 
getting a non-clean opinion, while customer size (log assets) lowers the chances.  The variables 
that, in some studies, proxy for  complexity, do not pick up anything in our sample:  neither 
AIR nor Inventory are associated with the probability of a non-clean opinion. 
Conclusion 
The accounting scandals and the demise of Andersen have increased auditors' ex ante business 
risk.  As  a result,  stock markets revised downward the value of the audit firms  (Asthana et 
al.  2003;  Chaney and Philipich 2002;  Krishnamurthy et al.  2002;  Callen and Morel 2002). 
One commonsensical reaction on behalf of auditors should have been to apply the existing 
rules more carefully and, thus, issue more non-clean audit opinions.  This is exactly what we 
see.  Closer scrutiny reveals that the higher incidence of non-clean opinions is not due to the 
(substantial) changes in the audit client list or their balance sheets. Instead, shifts in the client 
characteristics seem to have masked the Enron effect, and especially so in the non-Big5 sample. 
This study mirrors earlier results where auditors relaxed their standards following  a drop in Post-Enron auditing standards  10 
business risk (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2001, 2002; Francis and Krishnan, 2002). 
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